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Abstract 
The European Commission, Europe’s central supranational bureaucracy, is 
often depicted as a playground for external interests. The scholarly literature 
offers a range of sensible explanations how the Commission position is 
bound by national, organised societal, or party political interests. Despite 
substantial contributions, the empirical approach supporting such arguments 
often focuses on the mere comparison between a particular external interest 
and the legislative outcome. 
In this paper, we aim to add a more process-based, mechanismic perspective 
by empirically focussing the question how certain external interest found 
their way into a Commission position as captured by a legislative proposal. 
Against the background of a larger research project which analyses 48 
position formation processes in the Commission on the basis of 133 in-depth 
interviews with participating officials, this paper presents mechanisms 
linking external interest to the final Commission position and that are 
transferable across specific drafting processes and across different policy 
fields. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die europäische Kommission, zentraler bürokratischer Akteur der 
Europäischen Union, wird oft als Spielwiese externer Interessen dargestellt. 
Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur bietet vor diesem Hintergrund eine 
Reihe sinnvoller Erklärungen an, wie die Kommission bei ihrer 
Positionsbildung durch nationale, gesellschaftlich-organisierte oder 
parteipolitische Interessen beeinflusst  ist.. Trotz beachtlicher 
Forschungsbeiträge, beschränken sich empirische Arbeiten, die dieses 
Argument untermauern allerdings häufig auf den bloßen Vergleich eines 
bestimmten externen Interesses und dem Inhalt des letztlich von der 
Kommission vorgeschlagenen Gesetzes. 
Mit diesem Papier zielen wir darauf ab, diese Literatur um einen eher 
prozess- und mechanismus-orientierten Ansatz zu ergänzen indem wir 
empirisch der Frage nachgehen, wie externe Interessen ihren Weg in einen 
legislativen Kommissionsvorschlag gefunden haben. Wir greifen dabei auf 
ein breiteres Forschungsprojekts zurück, das 48 Politikformulierungs-
prozesse innerhalb der Kommission auf der Basis von 133 Interviews mit 
beteiligten Kommissionsbeamten analysiert. Auf dieser Grundlage lassen 
sich eine Reihe von Mechanismen identifizieren, die aufklären, wie externe 
Interessen mit der finalen Kommissionsposition verbunden sind, und die 
gleichzeitig über einzelne Prozesse und Politikfelder transferierbar sind.
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1. Introduction1 
The European Commission, Europe’s central supranational bureaucracy, is 
often depicted as a playground for external interests. Prominent literature 
strands provide valuable and sophisticated theoretical arguments on how 
certain external interest influence EU decision making and particularly the 
European Commission. In practice though, empirical examinations often 
focus on whether a respective interest is taken up by the Commission 
without paying attention to the exact mechanism at play. We know little 
about the exact micro-level causalities, processes and conditions allowing 
certain interests to enter into the decision-making process. How do external 
interests actually influence European legislation? What exactly triggers this 
exertion of influence on the Commission’s position? And last but not least, 
why and under what circumstances does the Commission take certain 
external interests into consideration as opposed to others?  
In this paper, we take such a ‘mechanismic’ perspective (Gerring, 2008) by 
empirically uncovering the causal pathway of how external interests enter 
the European Commission in legislative position formation. Rather than 
merely comparing positions of external interests to legislative outcomes, our 
ongoing research project adds an explicitly process-based perspective. 
Tracing position formation processes of the Commission from the initial idea 
to the final Commission proposal opens up the possibility of focusing 
empirically on how a particular external interest translated into the position 
the Commission finally proposed to Council and Parliament.  
This paper refers to insights gained inductively from 48 such cases and 
compares them in order to distil empirical pathways along which three 
prominent categories of influential external interests enter the 
Commission’s position: national, societal, or party political interests. The 
dominance of national interests in European decision making has been 
subject to scholarly debates from the early grand-theories of European 
integration onwards (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2000). The developing understanding of the EU as a more complex multi-
level system increased the interest in a number of actors beyond national 
governments. Organised societal interests have prominently gained attention 
                                                          
1 We gratefully acknowledge funding from a Volkswagen Foundation Schumpeter 
Fellowship. More information on the project can be found at http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/peu/
  
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th Pan-European Conference on EU 
Politics, Porto, 24-26 June 2010: We thank Stefanie Bailer, Hussein Kassim, Dieter Plehwe, 
and the participants of our panel for valuable comments. 
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by scholars analysing the influence of corporate lobbying and civil society 
forces on a rising output of individual EU decisions particularly in the 
context of the single market (e.g. Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Broscheid and 
Coen, 2003; Eising, 2007). The impact of party political interests on decision 
making, one of the core assumptions of political science, has recently been 
claimed to matter also for the EU system (e.g. Hix et al., 2005). These interest 
are considered to be increasingly important in the process of decision 
making at European level, due to its rising politicisation and the fact that 
scholars draw more and more often on classical concepts of political science 
when analysing the EU (e.g. Hooghe, 2001; Hix et al., 2006; Döring, 2007).  
From an analytical perspective, these three interest types can be separated 
while they arguably overlap in empirical terms. A national government, for 
example, may at times present party political interests. Likewise, a national 
position can result from the demands of domestic organised interest groups. 
Keeping such potential overlaps in mind, we analytically distinguish 
national, organised, and party political interests by focussing on the 
Commission level. Analytically speaking, an interest is considered national if 
it arrives via national representatives or national law at the supranational 
level. Likewise, party political or organised interests must arrive as such at 
the Commission to fall in our respective analytical category. Where we find 
that interests overlap we will provide the empirical evidence for the specific 
case. 
By uncovering the causal pathways linking particular national, societal and 
party political interests to the substance of a Commission proposal our 
approach does not claim universal generalisation. However, with our 
empirical approach we uncover mechanisms that are indeed transferable 
across different drafting processes and policy fields. This way, our results 
can contribute to refine theories, hypotheses and implications of position 
formation within the European Commission. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section lays out the empirical 
approach in greater detail. Sections three to five are organised along the 
three types of interests and present the detected mechanisms that emerged 
out of the inductive analysis. Each mechanism is complemented with typical 
empirical examples that rework the proposed causal chain for the empirical 
cases. Section six provides a systematizing overview across the mechanisms 
while the concluding section summarizes the insights and discusses their 
future value. 
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2. Zooming in: Mechanisms influencing the position of the Commission 
The paper aims to generate insights on the empirical patterns by which the 
European Commission forms its positions on legislative initiatives. We have 
stressed before the need to look at individual DGs instead of treating the 
Commission as a monolithic bloc and have discussed the independent effects 
of internal Commission coordination structures on position formation 
(Hartlapp et al., 2010). In turn, this paper concentrates more closely on 
agency effects. Our main interest is not to determine whether and with what 
relative weight external interests find their way into a DG’s position, but how 
this actually takes place. The research design laid out in this section is 
geared towards this aim. 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework: Context, factors, and mechanisms 
As noted, this paper focuses on causal processes whereby we differentiate 
between context, factors and mechanisms. Understanding mechanisms as 
causality capturing concepts their implications may become visible in 
correlations, but they are ultimately different. “The notion of mechanisms as 
intervening between I = the explanans and O= the explanandum takes 
correlational analysis visibly as point of departure and critically develops an 
alternative to it by adding the causal link M” (Mayntz, 2004: 244). In applying 
this approach to our research question, our analytical starting point is output 
O, the final position of a DG showing a bias towards a specific external 
interest. Input I is the position of an external interest (national, organised or 
party political) and M is the causal link that allows an external interest to 
enter the DG’s position. 
 
 
Figure 1: Focus on mechanisms 
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We define a ‘mechanism’ as the causal pathway or process that explains how 
an input I is linked to an output O. This definition is consensual among the 
broad variety of conceptions and definitions of what a ‘mechanism’ may be 
(e.g. Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Elster, 1998; George and Bennett, 2005; 
Gerring, 2008; Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Mayntz, 2004)2 Understood as concepts 
which uncover the underlying social process between factors or sets of 
factors, mechanisms are by nature relational concepts. “Mechanisms tell us 
how things happen: how actors relate, how individuals come to believe what 
they do or what they draw from past experiences, how policies and 
institutions endure or change, how outcomes that are inefficient become 
hard to reverse” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1147).3 
What renders mechanisms distinct from causal descriptions and justifies the 
claim of more general relevance is their portability across cases. In other 
words, a mechanism is a relatively abstract concept that “can travel from one 
specific instance […] of causation to another and that explains how a 
hypothesized cause creates a particular outcome in a given context” (Falleti 
and Lynch, 2009: 1145). With this view comes the understanding that a 
mechanism by itself cannot explain an outcome. Thus, the comprehensive 
causal chain linking the position of an external interest to the particular 
position proposed by a DG may include not only the mechanism at play, but 
also context and additional factors.4 We approach these categories, using 
what bears most empirical leverage for explanation. In doing so we apply a 
ladder of abstraction: where we have sufficient information to trace 
causality, we refer to mechanisms. If this is not the case we operate at the 
level or factors, e.g. portfolio allocation, or context, such as a changing 
political climate. It is difficult to draw a strict dividing line where the factor 
ends and the mechanism starts. Yet, we differentiate between factors and 
                                                          
2 Mayntz (2004: 246) gives an example of how the level of abstraction may vary: “‘Path 
dependent technological innovation,’ ‘increasing returns,’ and ‘positive feedback’ are 
increasingly general concepts that can be applied to the same case, for instance, the 
frequently cited QWERTY case of the typewriter keyboard”. 
3 Technically speaking: “Whereas variables are observable attributes of the units of analysis 
– with values (nominal, ordinal, or numerical) and with sample and population 
distributions – mechanisms are relational concepts. They reside above and outside the 
units in question, and they explain the link between inputs and outputs. Mechanisms 
describe the relationships or the actions among the units of analysis or in the cases of 
study.” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1147) 
4 This is also the reason why ultimately concluding assessments of influence are difficult to 
reach under this perspective. However, we substantially go beyond the notion of access by 
showing how an interest enters the final Commission position. 
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mechanisms by showing how the same factor may matter through a number 
of mechanisms each time impacting on the outcome. Linking a factor to the 
outcome, different mechanisms may even produce the same outcome – 
however along different causal pathways. 
Mechanism and context are different concepts and their interplay can 
explain the specific outcome. For example, how the mechanism ‘anticipation 
of Council shadow’ (M) connects the factor ‘external interest’ (I) to the ‘policy 
position of the Commission’ (O) may depend on the context specificities of 
the relevant policy field. 
 
2.2 Analytical framework: A y-centred perspective on Commission positions 
The paper offers a y-centred (Ganghof, 2005) and partially inductive approach 
to provide a cornerstone for the under-researched field of position 
formation within the European Commission. It is y-centred as we work 
backwards from DG positions as codified in the formal Commission proposal. 
We concentrate on issues of specific proposals where differences were 
visible between the lead DG and one or a number of external interests.5 
Knowing to which side of the interest spectrum a proposal leaned to in the 
end served as the starting point to re-work the process by which the 
preferred interest entered the position of the drafting DG. 
We consciously refrain from focusing on deductively generated mechanisms 
as this would risk missing other (yet unknown) explanations of perhaps 
equal (or even higher) significance. Instead, we take individual case studies 
as starting points and compare them in order to find the most typical 
pathways that link an external interest and the position of the Commission. 
In other words, the approach aims at distilling the abstract mechanisms by 
means of inductive comparison.  The endeavour is only partially inductive as 
we impose one restriction that helps us to come to grips with causal 
complexity while it ensures the ability to adapt and add to prominent 
strands of the literature. Our search for mechanisms is categorized along 
three groups of external interests that theoretically and empirically appear 
most relevant for European legislation: national interests, party interests, 
and other organised societal interests. 
                                                          
5 Note that we focus on mechanisms at play at the DG-level in the Commission. Empirically, 
this will often be the department holding the lead for a proposal, but some of the examples 
may also be for an involved or opposing DG; this does not make a difference for our 
argument and for the individual mechanisms at play. 
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Consequently, this entails leaving out some other factors we already know to 
be relevant for overall position formation in the Commission (see e.g. on the 
relevance of coordination structure and portfolio allocation: Hartlapp et al., 
2010). Here, we do not attempt to logically or empirically weigh these factors 
against other factors at play in position formation in the Commission. 
Instead, we aim at showing that a specific factor (here: external interests) 
matters in a specific case and particularly how – i.e. through which 
mechanisms – it becomes relevant.  
 
2.3 Empirical framework: Project background and data sources 
The empirical basis for this paper is a multiannual, collaborative research 
project on “Position Formation in the EU Commission” conducted at the 
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). This project systematically 
selected 49 binding secondary EU acts with universal entitlement within all 
member states of the EU. The selection procedure was guided by a focus on 
three policy fields – research and innovation, consumer policy, as well as 
market and social policy –, on the coverage of two Commission terms – Prodi 
and Barroso I – and on different decision-making procedures in the 
Commission (oral and written, cf. Hartlapp et al., 2010). 
We conducted 133 semi-structured expert interviews with involved 
Commission officials at different hierarchical levels (May to December 
2009).6 Interviews have been transcribed and coded with Atlas.ti and were 
complemented with the analysis of legal texts, press documentation and 
information from position papers. This material served as sources for 
drafting structured case studies covering a description of key issues, context 
conditions, the drafting process, and – in summary – the explanations for 
the positions a DG had taken. They are the primary input for this paper along 
which we distilled those mechanisms which have most explanatory power. 
They are presented in the following section. 
 
                                                          
6 As we have assured anonymity to the participating officials, we will refer to interview 
sources only by interview and paragraph numbering, such as COM88:99, for example. 
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3. How national interest are linked to the Commission’s position 
 
3.1 Anticipation of Council Shadow 
National interests can influence the Commission position through 
anticipation of Council decisions.7 To the extent that the drafting DG has 
sufficient information about the applicable decision rules for the respective 
proposal, individual member state preferences and the resulting 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of member states positions (Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000), the Commission positions itself according to the likely 
adoption or failure of an act. The transmission of such particular forms of 
preference setting into the drafting process can explain why the drafting DG 
caters specific national interests.8 
At the same time, the procedural nature of drafting enables the lead DG to 
partially circumvent such constraints by proactively influencing the member 
state preference setting in the course of time. If a DG pursues a particular 
policy agenda there are three counterstrategies which can be implemented 
to avoid adapting the DG’s position (fully or partially), even with the Council 
shadow looming large. First, the drafting DG may try to make alternatives to 
its own position less attractive for certain member states for example by 
threatening or enacting infringement procedures (“divide and conquer” or 
“lesser evil” strategies, Schmidt, 2000). Secondly, it may single out and 
isolate individually opposing member states during the drafting process, e.g. 
by moving intergovernmental confrontation to preparatory working groups 
(“isolation” strategy). Thirdly, the lead DG may direct the attention of member 
states to other contentious issues of a proposal or by framing the proposal 
differently to keep other potentially contentious issues beneath the radar 
(“red herring strategy”, similarly Hartlapp, 2010, forthcoming). In sum, the 
explanatory power of the shadow mechanism depends first and foremost on 
the preference setting in the Council, mediated by the amount of information 
                                                          
7 At an abstract level national interests can have different sources. Intergovernmentalist 
reasoning would base them on national, strategic, or economic interests. Others would put 
governmental self-interests or ideological stance to the fore and still others highlight the 
interdependence of nation states or international policy developments. As noted in the 
introduction, for us it is only relevant here whether it arrives at the Commission level as a 
national interest – independent of the possible explanations. 
8 In principle we could expect national interests to enter the Commission’s position via a 
similar ‘anticipation of EP mechanism’. However, on the basis of our empirical material a 
shadow of prospective EP decisions primarily emerged as a relevant mechanism for the 
influence of party politics (see section 5). 
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about member state preferences the lead DG has, while it may be partially 
countered by proactive strategies of the DG. 
 
Mechanism example 1: Food Supplements 
One example for this anticipation mechanism is the 2000 Commission 
proposal on food supplements. Food supplements are defined as concentrated 
sources of vitamins and minerals which are marketed as diet complements 
in dose form such as pills or drop dispensing bottles.9 The agenda of the lead 
DG SANCO (Health and consumer protection) was to “facilitate trade in these 
products” (COM88:26). This met different commercial interests in the 
member states, with the UK – the most liberal regime – supporting 
liberalisation to become an entry point to the European market (COM88:194). 
Countries such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy in turn had regulatory 
entry barriers in place treating food supplements as medicines thereby not 
only protecting their consumers but also their producers (COM88:112). 
The drafting officials had buried an initial policy proposal after facing an 
opposing Council majority in an 1992 Council meeting (COM88:194 Europe 
Information Service, 1997; DG III of the European Commission, 1997). As a 
consequence, they explicitly tried to change the preference setting in the 
Council in view of reaching a qualified majority. The DG initiated 
infringement procedures on particular trade barriers for food supplements 
in Germany and later Austria so as to convince these governments of “a 
Community solution rather than having to face it case by case” (COM88:98 
and 30, cf. “divide and conquer” Schmidt, 2000). The outcome was further 
influenced by a changing context altering the shadow of a possible Council 
decision. Consumer demand for food supplements rose and importantly, the 
1996 BSE crisis made interdependencies in European food markets a highly 
salient topic and raised member states demand for European food safety 
regulation and consumer protection (COM88:134). The drafting officials were 
well aware of these changes in national preferences because implementation 
and other food legislation generated “permanent contact” with member state 
authorities (COM88:30). 
Accordingly, policy formulation re-started using the original 1992 draft as a 
point of reference. However, the resulting proposal underlines how the 
shadow mechanism constrained position formation. For example, instead of 
simply prescribing market liberalization through negative integration the 
                                                          
9 Commission proposal COM(2000)222, later adopted as Directive 2002/46/EC of 10 June 
2002 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements. 
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proposal fully harmonised all safety related standards, taking the health 
concerns of the formerly opposing countries into account. Second, the list of 
allowed substances was more restrictive than the list that governed the UK 
regime at the time. Lastly, any future changes to this list will not be subject 
to a scientific committee – as is customary in other food legislation – but 
will be transferred to a comitology decision giving the more reluctant 
countries a greater say in defining which substances are allowed to enter 
their markets. 
 
Mechanism example 2: European Institute of Technology 
Likewise, the explanatory power of the anticipation of the Council vote can 
be underscored by a drafting process in the field of research and higher 
education policy. The regulation establishing a European Institute of 
Technology (EIT)10 proposes the creation of a European research institution 
based on the US Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The Commission 
proposal was initiated by President Barroso himself who wanted to create a 
genuine European university connecting the areas of higher education, 
research and innovation. Whereas the legal proposal presented by the 
Commission is rather flexible and blurry, one stunning element proposed is 
the institution’s autonomy. Article 7 of the proposal credits the EIT full 
autonomy and independent management from Community institutions and 
national authorities. In the light of qualified majority and extreme opposition 
from member states towards such an institute, this is particularly puzzling. 
How come the Commission was able to propose the EIT’s autonomy? 
The drafting of the EIT was dominated by the vehement criticism from many 
member states, most prominently from big member states like the UK and 
Germany, who made no secret of their opposition (COM12: 210, COM99: 142). 
Apart from general criticism, the most contentious issues were the sources 
of funding, the secondment of research personnel to the institute and the 
EIT’s ability to issue own degrees and diplomas (COM99:39, COM101:67). As 
the Commission needed the consent of member states in the up-coming 
inter-institutional process, it had to take their opposition into account. 
However, in the middle of these discussions, the Commission spotted its 
chance to introduce an otherwise not minor ‘hot potato’, a clause crediting 
the EIT full autonomy. Since “everybody was focused on degrees, the 
diplomas, budget […] nobody noticed it” (COM99:77). Thus, the Commission 
                                                          
10 Commission proposal COM(2006)604, later adopted as Regulation (EC) No 294/2008 of 11 
March 2008 establishing the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. 
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could advance its agenda on the institute’s autonomy. Next to direct member 
state influence on the specific points of budget, secondment, and diplomas, 
the cast of a shadow also allowed national interests to influence the content 
of the proposal in an indirect manner: by member states’ neglect of another 
issue, the institute’s autonomy. 
In sum, the examples from consumer and research policy highlight how the 
shadow of Council majorities linked national interests to the position finally 
contained in the Commission proposals. Having the necessary information 
about member state preferences at their disposal while drafting, the 
responsible officials adapted to these constraints while they also tried to 
pro-actively change or circumvent them in order to pursue their original 
agenda. 
 
3.2 Transfer of Templates 
A further, distinct mechanism through which particular national interests 
enter the position of the Commission is the proactively sought transfer of 
extant national templates. We consider this mechanism to be a specific form 
of learning (for an overview see Visser and Hemerijck, 2001; Hartlapp, 2009). 
In the context of legislation, position formation by transferring extant legal 
templates learning from the experience of others is the most likely case 
(“lesson drawing” Rose, 1991; cf. also first mover advantage Héritier, 1996), 
although we can not rule out that learning through the interaction with 
others takes place, too (Sabel, 1994). In both cases the Commission’s position 
changes in reaction to a modified information pool which is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for position change.11 
The transfer mechanism unfolds its explanatory power in the interplay with 
the initial position with which the drafting DG enters the position formation 
process. Our sample of cases presents different extremes: It ranges from 
drafting processes in which the lead DG had no own agenda but faced the 
need to bring forward a proposal, to processes in which a DG already had a 
particular policy agenda which affected which national templates are 
considered for a transfer. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11  Note that we do not engage with questions of depths of learning, i.e. whether the learning 
occurs in contexts of problem solving or whether it entails change in preferences. 
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Mechanism example 1: Financial Conglomerates 
One example for a transfer mechanism in the absence of a particular agenda 
was the proposed directive on financial conglomerates.12 Financial 
conglomerates are large financial groups active in different financial sectors 
–  often across borders – offering a range of financial services in areas such 
as banking, insurance and securities. The aim of the Commission’s proposal 
was to stabilise the market by requiring supplementary supervision for 
homogenous groups and by promoting convergence in national supervisory 
approaches and between sectors. 
Financial conglomerates were among the issues the Commission had argued 
to be in need of EU regulation in its flagship Financial Services Action Plan 
in 1999. Thus, there was commitment at the political level. Yet, when it came 
to substance and concrete standards in the envisaged act, the Internal Market 
and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) resembled a blank sheet – 
drafting officials had no clear policy vision despite being free to come up 
with such (COM76:36). What is more, financial conglomerates were a hitherto 
unregulated area at EU level but also in most member states (COM76:32, 
COM95:31). Only the Scandinavian and Benelux countries could be described 
as precursors. In the 1990s, they had consolidated regulation of financial 
conglomerates with regard to avoiding double gearing of equity capital and 
assuring equity capitalisation, which often included institutionalisation of 
supervision by a new authority (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005: 48). 
DG MARKT actively approached a national expert known for his expertise to 
come to work on the issue in the Commission and to draft the proposal. It is 
curial for our argument that this expert came from a member state which 
had especially high concentration of financial conglomerates as well as 
advanced regulation in the area. Once recruited, the national expert was able 
to work very freely and to advance the Commission proposal along the lines 
of what he had known in his country before. Note however, that the national 
patterns were in turn partly influenced by international policy 
developments. “I did not have to start from scratch, I could use some, I would 
say domestic and international information and again at least at our national 
level approaches which we had discussed with our groups and we were 
already implementing” (COM76:36). Conditional to this was the lack of an 
                                                          
12  Commission proposal COM(2001)213 later adopted as Directive 2002/87/ of 16 December 
2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 
98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC.  
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agenda in the Commission against the background of the official political 
commitment that had been voiced the year before in the context of the 
Financial Service Action Plan.  
 
Mechanism example 2: Consumer Credit 
In contrast to the example of financial conglomerates, a transfer of national 
templates as a specific form of learning also occurs in conjunction with a 
particular policy agenda of the drafting DG. An example is the proposal on 
consumer credit13 that focuses on credit agreements offered to consumers 
and thereby defines rights for consumers and obligations for lenders. 
It was drafted by the freshly established Directorate General for Health and 
Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) whereas financial services had fallen under 
the responsibility of DG MARKT before. This required the drafting SANCO 
officials to justify their legislative initiative beyond a purely market-making 
purpose (COM89:90 and 94). Indeed, the unit set out with the “ambition […] to 
create a very comprehensive, very exhaustive consumer credit regulation 
which would be burdensome for industry” (COM89:46), aimed at protecting 
the “weak consumer” (COM89:46 and 82). 
This agenda met with the technical complexity of the subject matter 
(COM111:194) while the drafting process was impaired by a lack of necessary 
resources (COM89:33). Against this background the drafting officials 
developed a strategic pick-and-choose of those national rules that provided 
the greatest benefits of an enhanced consumer protection (COM119:35). 
Indeed, the affected industry perceived the proposal as “selecting the most 
stringent provisions on consumer credit in force in each member state and 
summarizing them in the new EU rules for consumer credit” (European 
Savings Bank Group, 2003: 2-3) 
Especially for two exemplary provisions this transfer mechanism can be 
highlighted. First, the rules on cost elements creditors use in calculating the 
annual percentage rate of charge (APR) define the major indicator of the 
overall price a consumer has to pay to the lender for granting credit to the 
consumer. The drafting officials required lenders to also include third party 
costs, such as notary fees, for example (COM89:30). These rules in the 
proposal were “basically modelled […] on the Belgian consumer credit 
                                                          
13  Commission proposal COM(2002)443, later adopted as Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 
2008 on credit agreements for consumers. 
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procedure […] because the Belgian law was a very comprehensive one” 
(COM89:46). 
Secondly, the so-called ‘joint and several liability’, which basically makes 
creditors co-responsible for insufficiencies of goods the consumer has 
bought with the credit, even if creditor and seller are not the same legal 
person (COM89:37). The drafted text was quite literally adopted from the 
famous Section 75 of the UK Consumer Credit Act. In other European member 
states though, this rule was considered “totally outlandish” and thus the 
banking industry “strongly opposed” (European Savings Bank Group, 2003: 
12). Despite its contradiction to most other national regimes this section was 
arguably the most consumer-friendly solution to a regulation of creditor 
liability the drafting officials could find (COM89:50 and 37-44, COM119:62). 
Taken together, the financial conglomerates and the consumer credit 
directive are two examples which highlight how the transfer mechanism 
influences the Commission position as a specific form of learning from the 
experience of member states. Advanced national regulation was allowed to 
function as template either where no own agenda existed or where they met 
the agenda of the lead DG. In both cases the mechanism of transferring 
existing policy solutions from member states explains important provisions 
in the proposed policy. 
 
4. How organised interests enter the Commission’s position 
The synopsis of our individual case studies with regard to a mechanism 
linking organised societal interests to the final position of the Commission 
can be termed Exchange of Resources. External societal interests are viewed 
as to a large extent dependent on the Commission’s quasi monopoly of 
initiative in order to influence European policies effectively (Mazey and 
Richardson, 2006). The Commission’s DGs’ dependence on societal actors 
providing critical resources for effective policy-making – be it political 
support or legitimacy, as well as expertise and knowledge – may vary to a 
larger extent (Bouwen, 2004). Our case studies have revealed that the 
influence of an organised interest on a DG’s position is particularly high in 
cases where the DG’s dependence on the respective interest is high. Thus, the 
exchange of resources works in conjunction with a context that provides for 
varying degrees of mutual dependencies between the DG and the organised 
interest (Pfeffer and Salancik, [1978] 2003). These dependencies may either 
have grown over time or be of a more ad-hoc nature, owing to changes in 
the broader political context. Different developments may make specific 
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stakeholders to crucial external actors possessing resources that are critical 
for a DG’s proposal. In the following we distinguish between two mechanisms 
of Exchange of Resources according to the resources that are provided: 
legitimacy and expertise.14 
 
4.1 Exchange of Resources: Legitimacy 
Organised societal interests can provide the Commission with legitimacy; 
that is they can underscore the rightfulness of the DG’s powers by indicating 
the support of those governed. Accordingly, the Commission may adapt its 
position to increase the broad political support expected to be necessary for 
a policy decision. Legitimacy cannot be produced or provided by any 
organised interests at will. Rather, the specific political and policy context 
determines which organised societal interests can provide legitimacy by 
signalling the support of their constituencies. Consequently, here the 
Commission is dependent on those actors able to provide legitimacy and thus 
we face a situation of limited Commission discretion. 
To give an example, a DG may have responsibilities that have developed over 
time in such a way that they primarily address one specific stakeholder 
group and DG activity in this field is primarily legitimized by the very 
existence of this specific stakeholder group. Therefore, this group is endowed 
with the critical resource of legitimacy the DG needs in this area. 
Alternatively, the political climate may change in such a way that public or 
political attention is directed towards a specific societal interest in the policy 
area at stake. This increases the weight of the position of this group and 
makes the support of this very group crucial for a policy of a DG.  
 
Mechanism example 1: Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
A case where the supply of political legitimacy granted external interest 
access to the position formation process is the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), a Community funding programme 
running from 2007 to 2013.15 The CIP arose from the Commission’s wish for a 
                                                          
14  In our understanding, the mechanisms differ along other dimensions than only the type 
of resource exchange – a crucial dimension seems to be the degree of dependency altering 
the nature of the relationship. However, by lack of more specific labels we opt – for the 
time being – for the two mechanisms ‘exchange of resources: legitimacy’ and ‘exchange of 
resources: expertise’. 
15 Proposal COM(2005)121, later adopted as Decision No 1639/2006/EC of 24 October 2006 
establishing a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007 to 2013). 
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comprehensive, visible and important European funding programme for 
competitiveness and innovation (COM49:234, COM5:34). All the EU’s various 
small funding activities in the field of innovation should be integrated into 
one large programme.16 What is puzzling about the CIP is that the 
Commission did not present a coherent programme in its final proposal but a 
chapeau called ‘CIP’ containing several sub-programmes. The result of the 
drafting process was not the introduction of the completely new 
competitiveness and innovation programme initially envisaged (COM51), but 
rather a continuation of several different smaller innovation funding 
programmes framed as one single big program. What had happened? 
An important reason for this outcome was attributed to mutual resource 
dependencies between organisational units in the Commission and well 
established stakeholder groups:17 When the Commission first proposed the 
idea of having a single integrated innovation programme the different 
stakeholder groups of already existing small innovation programmes were 
immediately alarmed. They feared that a new, broader programme would 
entail substantial changes in funding mechanisms they had adapted to over 
the last few years or decades (COM51:150). These concerns were primarily 
expressed towards their ‘home DGs’, the individual DGs having previously 
been responsible for the different small innovation programmes. For 
example, micro-enterprises and SME support networks expressed their 
concerns towards the DG for Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR). The 
electronic publishing and content industry in turn articulated their concerns 
towards the Information Society and Media Directorate General (DG INFSO). In 
turn, the responsible units in the DGs vehemently articulated these concerns 
in the internal drafting process (COM49:89, COM51:124, COM68:33). 
Because these programmes had been running for such a long time, close 
relationships between the responsible Commission officials and the 
respective stakeholder groups had developed (COM5:70, COM51:135). This 
lead to mutual dependencies: while stakeholders depended and relied on the 
                                                          
16 E.g. DG Enterprise’s (ENTR) ‘Multiannual programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship, 
and in particular for SMEs’ (MAP), DG Information Society’s (INFSO) ‘Multiannual 
Community programme to stimulate the development and use of European digital content 
on the global networks and to promote linguistic diversity in the information society’ 
(eContent) and the programme on ‘series of guidelines for trans-European 
telecommunications networks’ (eTEN) or DG Transport and Energy’s (TREN) ‘Intelligent 
Energy – Europe’ programme (IEE) 
17 This does not imply that national interests. for example. did not play a role at all in 
designing this funding programme. However, our interview partners put explicit emphasis 
on the role of the type of interest we classify as ‘organised interests’. 
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individual innovation programmes, their existence also provided these EU 
funding streams with additional legitimacy. Thus, by demonstrating the 
support of established stakeholder communities the responsible Commission 
units could argue for a continuation of their small funding streams and could 
prevent them of being replaced by a single comprehensive programme. 
 
Mechanism example 2: Insurance Mediation 
The proposal for a directive on insurance mediation or intermediaries is 
another case in the field of the common market, exemplifying how the 
Commission’s need for legitimacy allowed organised societal interests to 
enter the Commission’s position.18 Like the Directive on Financial 
Conglomerates mentioned above, this act was envisaged in the Financial 
Services Action Plan in 1999. To meet this promise, lead DG MARKT initially 
had wanted to simply update a forerunner directive 77/92/EEC on the 
activities of insurance agents and brokers and combine it with an existing 
recommendation 92/48/EEC establishing certain criteria for intermediaries 
on a non-binding basis (AE, 1997a). Yet, the proposal adopted in 2000 goes 
substantially beyond these earlier instruments. The most interesting aspect 
for this paper is that it guarantees a high level of protection for customers. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the Commission had valued industry interests 
when it came to financial intermediaries but now understood this measure 
to fall short of the desired outcome to boost the financial market. This 
sluggish performance of financial services seems to have triggered new 
policy dynamics, shifting the EU policy-making focus from mainly 
commercial activity to including retailing for private customers. In turn, 
strengthening the position of consumers was seen as functional to 
furthering market integration: “It will increase the choice of insurance 
products available to customers and help ensure they can trust the advice 
they are getting from intermediaries” (Commissioner Bolkestein cited in: AE, 
2002; AE, 1997c; AE, 1997a; AE, 1997b). The changed political climate 
required DG MARKT to listen to different organised interests when in search 
for a functionally optimal policy on insurance mediation – an important 
                                                          
18 Intermediaries are institutions distributing financial products of a financial institution in 
their own name and account. This includes organisations and businesses where the main 
scope is not insurance, e.g. travel agencies, car dealers, insurance brokers and banks.
  
Commission proposal COM(2000)511, later adopted as Directive 2002/92/EC of 9 December 
2002 on insurance mediation. 
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move in the financial services area where corporate capture still seems to be 
the dominant pattern (ALTER-EU, 2009). 
Looking at the outcome, the influence of consumer interests is traceable in 
two specific aspects of the directive. First, consumer oriented organised 
interests are at the core to explain why DG MARKT went beyond merely 
updating existing legislation. The European Consumers’ Organisation BEUC is 
reported to have particularly insisted “that the new legislation must 
introduce compulsory requirements based on the 1991 recommendation” 
(AE, 1997a, also COM109:80; AE, 1997b). DG MARKT followed this request in 
search of increasing market efficiency. Secondly, the influence of consumer 
interest is clearly visible in specific key provisions of the act. Concerning the 
scope, the initial exclusion of ‘small’ intermediaries with a limited annual 
volume of premiums collected was recalled due to the effective influence of 
organised interests arguing that especially these intermediaries could pose 
problems for the protection of consumers. Similar influence can be traced 
for information requirements vis-à-vis customers, but also professional 
requirements for intermediaries when registering in a country (COM109:98). 
These research and market policy cases show how one and the same 
mechanism allowed organised interests to enter the Commission’s position. 
In both cases context factors – for the CIP long-developed relationships, for 
the financial conglomerates a changed political climate – manoeuvred the 
Commission into a situation of dependency on specific organised societal 
interests for legitimacy. These constraints required the Commission to take 
the positions of these interests into account. 
 
4.2 Exchange of Resources: Knowledge 
Next to offering legitimacy, organised interests can also influence the 
Commission’s position by offering knowledge and expertise. The Commission 
may act in accordance with lessons drawn from the experience or the 
information offered by organised interests and change its position 
accordingly. In contrast to the mechanism described above, here, the 
Commission often has more leeway in deciding which sources of 
information it selects, i.e. to which organised interest (or a number of them) 
it listens. 
Much like in the case of Transfer of Templates, this mechanism unfolds 
additional explanatory power in the interplay with specific context 
conditions. The Commission may either pursue a policy agenda of it’s own, 
allowing those organised interests to influence the Commission that can 
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actually provide information which in turn helps to reach objectives more 
effectively. Or, where the Commission lacks the necessary expertise and does 
not follow a specific agenda, the influence of organised interests should be 
much more open. The extent to which the drafting DG pursues an agenda of 
it’s own or rather acts as a “sponge” (COM33:362) absorbing existing 
information affects which of the organised interests manage to enter the 
Commission. 
 
Mechanism example 1: Consumer Rights 
The 2008 proposal on consumer rights19 regulates contractual rules 
governing business-to-consumer relations such as commercial guarantees, 
information duties of traders, or unfair contract terms. Those contractual 
rules lead to a strong opposition between business and consumer 
associations (e.g. BEUC, 2007; EuroCommerce, 2007). 
The need for drafting emerged out of the Commission’s regulatory 
simplification strategy, which identified the extant consumer rights 
directives as one priority, based on the observation that cross-border 
business-to-consumer trade was hardly developing (COM28:22, Commission 
of the European Communities, 2005: esp.: 36). An initial review of the extant 
legislation came to the conclusion that both business and consumers were 
reluctant to trade cross-border which resulted in the “twinned objectives” of 
the responsible SANCO officials: already at the set-off it was planned to both 
remove trade barriers for business while at the same time increasing 
consumer confidence in cross-border protection (COM93:46, COM120:37, cf. 
Commission of the European Communities, 2008), a middle road that was 
termed “targeted maximum harmonisation” (COM93:58).  
Beyond this basic commitment, the drafting officials faced strong political 
and informational demands but lacked the necessary capacities. While it was 
politically “a major legislative issue” (COM93:48) with a “very general nature” 
(COM80:57), the initiative was “extremely technical” and “legally a very 
complex thing” (COM93:208, COM120:171). This was contrasted by a limited 
number of personnel resources and resulted in a high workload of the 
involved officials (COM93:164-8). In order to counter their lacks of expertise, 
the drafting officials broadly allowed industry and consumer associations to 
provide information while they structured these along their twinned 
objectives. They started “structured conversations” with the affected 
                                                          
19 Commission proposal COM(2008)614 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on consumer rights; not yet adopted by Council and Parliament. 
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organised societal interests (COM80:79), which began with four consultation 
papers on individual issues of the proposal which asked for responses of 
affected interest groups and was followed by a public consultation (Green 
Paper). Further, a range of systematic contacts with outside interests were 
organised such as a conference, business and stakeholder questionnaires 
(COM28:5), as well as a series of workshops discussing legislative changes 
with different options. Lastly, the drafting officials held an “extremely huge 
number of bilateral meetings” with interest representatives (COM120:49). 
These processes resulted in a proposal which takes up both the demands of 
business and consumers, both in its overall approach of harmonising beyond 
the lowest common denominator, and between and within the individual 
issues of the proposal. An example would be the rules on commercial 
guarantees: On the one hand, the proposal prescribes that the trader is 
generally liable for two years while consumers had preferred longer periods 
that existed in some countries (e.g. BEUC, 2009: 6). On the other hand, this 
minor net decrease in protection is balanced by an obligation to renew 
guarantees for replaced goods, a rule that existed in only one national 
regime before and can be traced to consumer associations’ demands (DG 
Health and Consumer Protection, 2007: 18). 
 
Mechanism example 2: Public Procurement 
EU public procurement directives20 aim at ensuring that government and 
state owned bodies offer contracts not only to bidders from their member 
state but to all other EU countries. They have to select tenders competitively 
– i.e. best value for money – and not according to other political criteria. 
Given the complexity of these acts, the bad application of existing legislation 
as well as evolutions in information technology and modern administration, 
DG MARKT saw itself under “pressure to modify certain things” (COM69:94) in 
a search for perfecting the internal market. Apart from the technical 
challenges, DG MARKT also had to convince other actors of the necessity of 
having a new act and to circumvent specific sectoral or member state 
                                                          
20 Commission proposal COM(2000)276, later adopted as Directive 2004/17/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors; and Commission proposal COM(2000)275, later adopted as Directive 2004/18/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts. 
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interests. Organised interests proofed helpful to tackle these different 
challenges: they provided data and could hint at technical deficits. 
Advisory committees on public procurement21 are permanently established 
bodies. They were involved in the drafting process alongside interest groups 
since the beginning in April 1998. “They did come up with information on 
special legal problems in the member states as for economic data or 
statistics” (COM16:188). The Commission was happy to use this information. 
An example how this mechanism mattered is the introduction of member 
state requirements to collect statistical data on public procurement and 
report these to the Commission annually. Here, expert groups were used to 
assist in the development of indicators independently of member state 
interests: “How can we develop indicators, in order to have some statistics? 
How can we deal with it[?]” (COM22:140). 
It is important to note that by this procedure not all information was valued 
equally by DG MARKT. The value rather depended on what best served their 
own agenda with respect to public procurement: “Certain comments were 
useful because they were going more or less in the same direction that we 
were, others could be useful in showing were the problems were, how 
perhaps to take into account to the extent possible, others could be useful in 
nothing else in showing us which differences in points have to be prepared 
for the discussions” (COM16:176, also COM22:127). Thus, although there was a 
quest from the Commission for data on experience with public procurement, 
this was coupled to an interest in support for the Commission’s own 
solutions developed on the basis of the so increased knowledge base. 
For the cases on consumer rights and public procurement stakeholders could 
influence the Commission’s proposal by offering expertise. In both cases the 
need to prepare a legislative initiative combined with a lack of resources to 
achieve these rather comprehensive tasks made Commission officials turn to 
affected organised societal interests. Consequently, in providing knowledge 
these interests influenced the final position of the Commission. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 These committees differ in their composition, e.g. the ‘advisory committee on public 
contracts’ is mainly composed of Member State representatives while the ‘advisory 
committee on the opening of public procurement’ is constituted of academics and 
professional associations representing themselves. 
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5. How party interests are linked to the Commission’s position 
 
5.1 Anticipation of EP Shadow 
Whereas our cases revealed a shadow of the Council vote to primarily allow 
national interests to influence the Commission’s position, a shadow of the 
EP’s vote allows party political interests to enter the Commission’s position.22 
The logic is similar to the Council shadow mechanism described above. As 
the majority of EU legislation is adopted in co-decision procedure, the EP’s 
vote is as important. When drafting legislative proposals the Commission 
therefore also has to anticipate EP majorities along party political lines. In 
forming a position the Commission acts in accordance with signals from 
parties.  
 
Mechanism example 1: Cross-border Healthcare 
The proposal for the directive on cross-border healthcare23 allows Europeans 
to seek healthcare anywhere in the EU and be reimbursed at home. Non-
hospital care, such as dental treatment and medical consultations, can be 
sought without prior authorisation. In turn, for hospital treatment, such as 
surgery, prior authorisation is required. Although many of the standards had 
in principle been established by ECJ rulings since the late 1980s, legal 
uncertainty prevailed without more specific legislation. Initial attempts to 
cover health services in the liberalization of services directive were rejected 
– it was especially the EP which had called for legislation respecting the 
nature of the healthcare sector. 
Commission’s first internal draft the proposed act features consumer 
interests more prominently. Further, DG Consumer and Health Affaires was 
now assigned chef de file instead of DG MARKT, originally in charge of 
service liberalization. This is said to result from Barroso’s aim to be re-
elected in 2009 and the necessary support this re-election entailed from the 
                                                          
22 Note that in principle both types of interests may be represented in both institutions. The 
literature argues that depending on the issue at stake votes in the EP are likely to reflect 
national or ideological dividing lines (Höpner, 2005; Hix et al., 2005). Similarly at times the 
Council has been said to act according to ideological positions (Tallberg and Johansson, 
2008). However, in our empirical cases clear patterns emerged with the Council reflecting 
national interests and the EP providing an entry point for party political interests. 
23 Commission proposal COM(2008)414 for a directive on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare has gained a de facto majority in the Council only very recently 
(June 2010) and has not yet been adopted in the Council. 
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left wing in the EP (COM35).24 Thus, the shift towards a consumer friendly 
position can be partly seen as reaction to the sceptical inclination of the 
Socialists in the EP. The Commission anticipated the ideologically necessary 
position to gain support from a specific fraction in the EP. Barroso was 
“basically saying ‘well present it in a way which looks like it is very good 
from a citizens point of view and get us under a sort of citizens’ Europe’” 
(COM73:72). The parallel re-election rather than the adoption of the proposal 
at hand was the decision for which support from the Socialists in the EP was 
sought.  
This case shows how the political power of the EP casts its shadow on the 
Commission’s position in an important directive in the area of transnational 
healthcare regulation. Here, the mechanism worked indirectly, since the 
shadow loomed from a different decision. As the Commission needed the EP’s 
approval in a different matter taking place at the same time, it had to avoid 
potential party political opposition and take the respective interests in a 
specific position into account. 
 
5.2 Ideological Advocacy 
Party interests can influence the Commission’s position through the 
personal affiliation or commitment of a Commission official to a party 
political position. The mechanism emphasizes the role of the individuals in 
the Commission that adhere to and advocate the respective party political 
position in the Commission. The ideological value or assumed necessity this 
person assigns to an act influences the Commissions position. Our empirical 
analyses over 48 cases have revealed that party interests are most likely to 
influence the Commission position if they are represented at a high 
hierarchical level, i.e. by a Director General or Commissioner.25 In the latter 
case, successful ideological advocacy appears to be conditional upon the 
consensual decision taking mode in the College. Although formally qualified 
majority voting is the rule, the overwhelming number of decisions in the 
Prodi and Barroso Commissions are said to have been taken by unanimity 
(COM113, Egeberg, 2006; Barroso, 2007). 
                                                          
24Besides other factors were also at play to explain the shifting of arenas here, e.g. the 
change of responsible Commissioner. 
25 Access to important players at the Commission’s political level can be seen an important 
factor for all external interests aiming at influencing the Commission’s position. However, 
our cases this was found to be especially important in the case of party politics. 
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For this mechanism the underlying reasons for a Commissioner to hold a 
party political position are secondary. However, we observed that the 
advocates of party political interest had long-standing party careers before 
entering the Commission and that the issues where advocacy happened 
touched upon the core ideologies of the respective parties. This conforms 
more to a socialization logic (cf Hooghe, 2001) rather than a delegation chain 
unfolding on the basis of rationalist office seeking for which the basic 
conditions have not been validated empirically (Wonka, 2007, Döring, 2007 
#3532). 
 
Mechanism example 1: Cross-border Healthcare 
The directive on cross-border healthcare discussed above does not only 
demonstrate how party political interests enter through anticipation of the 
EP shadow. It is also exemplary for an alternative mechanism to link party 
political interests to a specific outcome. In this chapter, we will show how 
the mechanism of Ideological Advocacy was at work to explain the outcome 
for one of the key provisions in the directive: prior authorisation. 
Many cabinets intervened against the cross-border healthcare directive 
criticizing its “high costs and the negative impact on national health 
systems” (EUobserver, 2008). Especially the socialist Commissioners Vladimir 
Spidla, Margot Wallström and Peter Mandelson expressed their criticism 
firmly. This corresponds with evidence provided by Martinsen (2009: 802) 
regarding the active role the PSE, and especially the President of the EP, Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen, took in stopping the proposal and changing crucial 
standards, i.a. by contacting the socialist Commissioners directly. Socialist 
Swede Margot Wallström is a case in point to confirm that ideological 
positions mattered rather than national interests since the Swedish 
government was among the supporters of the proposal (Baeten, 2009: 158). 
Changes undertaken cover a broad number of issues and are influenced also 
by other factors and mechanisms. What is clear, however, is that many of the 
changes undertaken from the first to the second draft clearly aimed at 
rendering the proposal less market-liberal. The initial DG SANCO proposal 
allowed individuals seeking cross-border healthcare, including hospital care, 
to choose between 1) prior authorisation and complete reimbursement or 2) 
to choose the place of treatment without prior authorisation and partial 
reimbursed according to level of the country of origin. Here Wallström had 
argued that “more thought and reflexion need to be put into the proposal, in 
particular the reimbursement system, and its consequences“ (her spokesmen 
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J. Hennon, cited in EurActiv, 2008a). The Commission’s final position 
presented in October 2008 shows substantial changes, now offering the 
choice between 1) no prior authorisation and reimbursement up to the 
country of origin level, and 2) the installation of a prior authorisation system 
upon request of member states and permission by the Commission. 
Moreover, the 2008 proposal clearly addresses the conditions for 
authorisation that would be allowed in case the consequent outflow would 
seriously undermine the financial balance of the social security system. 
These changes can be characterized as turning away from a liberal market 
principle and a choice for individuals as initially envisaged by DG SANCO 
(EurActiv, 2008b) – thus, they seem ideologically more appropriate to 
socialist concerns. Moreover, the College Minutes from 2.7.2008 do not report 
any discussion or voting on patient’s right in cross border health care. This 
further supports the assumption that the Commission’s proposal has been 
changed in a way allowing for socialist Commissioners to accept it more 
easily.  
 
Mechanism example 2: Euratom Research Framework Programme 
The area of research policy provides for an additional example of the 
mechanism of ideological advocacy at work. The Community’s 6th Euratom 
Research Framework Programme26 funds research on nuclear energy 
primarily in the areas of fission and fusion. In the 6th Research Framework 
Programme (FP6) the Euratom part of the Commission proposal reveals a 
smaller proposed budget than in the foregoing 5th Framework Programme 
(FP5), i.e. not only in relative but in absolute terms as well.27 This is puzzling, 
as EU funding programmes usually follow “the principle of conservation of 
budget in the Commission” (COM96:73). This means that once a funding 
stream has been established at Community level, the Commission will try to 
maintain and expand it. Particularly in the legislative proposals the 
Commission presents to Council it aims for a higher budget, which is the 
“negotiation game usually” (COM 98: 65). 
                                                          
26 Proposal COM(2001)94-2, later adopted as 2002/668/Euratom: Council Decision of 3 June 
2002 concerning the sixth framework programme of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) for nuclear research and training activities, also contributing to the 
creation of the European Research Area (2002 to 2006). 
27 The FP5 Euratom Programme had a budget of 1.26 Bio. EUR for five years, in the FP6 
proposal the Commission only proposes 1.23 Bio. EUR for five years (in contrast the EC 
part in FP5 had a volume of EUR 14.96 Bio. and the EC FP6 proposed an amount of EUR 
16.475 Bio.). 
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An important factor explaining why the FP6 Euratom proposal did not 
suggest a higher budget is that at the time the FP6 was drafted and adopted 
in the Commission, the Commissioner for Budget was a Green party 
politician who was “adamantly opposed to nuclear energy” (COM102:97, also 
COM82:38). Next to unanimity de facto being applied in the Barroso I College 
(Barroso, 2007), the Green Commissioner’s influence was increased through a 
portfolio logic: being the Commissioner for Budget she had a pronounced say 
in the Commission-internal negotiations. The responsible DG in charge of the 
Framework Programme, the DG for Research and Technological Development 
(DG RTD) had little other choice than taking the opposing party political 
position into account. Consequently, the budget for nuclear energy in the 
final proposal was reduced. 
The cases on cross-boarder healthcare and the Euratom Research Framework 
Programme both emphasize the role of individual actors at the political level 
in the Commission for the influence of party political interests. In both cases, 
party political positions could influence the Commission’s legislative 
proposal by being strongly defended by individual advocates with quasi-veto 
power at the Commission’s top-hierarchy. 
 
6. The birds eye perspective: Overview on mechanisms at play 
Having plunged deep into the case studies to identify the specific causal 
pathways of how the theoretically and empirically most relevant types of 
external interests impact on the Commission policy position, we now zoom 
out again in an attempt to bring some order into chaos. We showed how 
national interests influenced the Commission’s position. First, in the 
Anticipation of Council Shadow mechanism, the Commission positions itself 
according to the likely adoption or failure of an act in the Council. Secondly, 
where Transfer of Templates is at work, Commission positions are influenced 
through a specific form of learning that takes the experience of member 
states into account. Mechanisms identified for the second type of external 
interests, organised societal interests, function on the basis of Exchange of 
Resources. External interests are granted influence because the Commission 
is dependent on the resources they offer. Be they first, legitimacy or political 
support as a limited good or may they, secondly, influence through lessons 
drawn from the experience or the information they offered. Finally, party 
political interests have been shown to enter the Commission either through 
Anticipation of EP Shadow, i.e. the position is formed in reaction to signals 
from ideological splits in another institution, or through Ideological 
Advocacy, where individuals in the Commission influence the proposed 
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position on the basis of what is perceive the likely ideological value or 
necessity of the act. 
The analysis of causal pathways shows that each of the three interest 
categories outlined above enter the Commission’s position primarily via two 
different mechanisms. Presenting a first attempt at systematizing the 
identified mechanisms, Table 1 groups them along common dimensions. 
 
Table 1: Overview of mechanisms 
 Political constraint 
mechanisms 
Policy implication 
mechanisms 
National interests Anticipating Council 
Shadow 
Transfer of Templates 
Organised societal 
interests 
Exchange of Resources: 
Legitimacy 
Exchange of Resources: 
Expertise 
Party political interests Anticipating EP Shadow (Ideological Advocacy) 
 
The mechanisms ‘Anticipating Council Shadow’, ‘Exchange of Resources: 
Legitimacy’ and ‘Anticipating EP Shadow’ are all characterized by an air of 
constraint. In all three cases the anticipation of future decision-taking and 
the Commission’s priority or need of external support and acceptance for the 
proposed policy shadowed on the internal drafting process. This allowed 
external interests to enter the Commission’s position. The encompassing 
element these three mechanisms have in common is the Commission’s 
prospective view on possible consequences of its position taken – either its 
proposal is not adopted (shadow of Council, shadow of EP), or it looses 
legitimacy or support, which is undesirable for the Commission primarily on 
the long run. Thus, these mechanisms can be grouped along their view on 
political constraints. 
In contrast, where the mechanisms of ‘Transfer of Templates’ and ‘Exchange 
of Resources: Expertise’ played out, the rules of the game were not 
dominated by the prevalence of perceived political constraints, but by a focus 
on policy implications of the proposal during the emergence of a policy. This 
does not imply that actor constellations, their interests or the anticipation of 
majorities were not important. However, the emphasis lies on the fact that 
they did not determine the causal pathway leading to their influence. Rather, 
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it was the external input of (alternative) policy solutions that granted 
external interests access. 
Finally, the mechanism of ‘Ideological Advocacy’ does not fit this 
categorization as easily. One explanation is that this mechanism was visible 
much more rarely, giving us less leverage as to commonalities and specific 
conditions across cases. What was clearly visible is that in our empirical 
cases party political positions were mediated via opposition. Tentatively, 
however we add that having revealed socialization being the dominant factor 
motivating this opposition, and not the anticipation of career perspectives, 
the idea of party political positions providing alternative policy solutions 
may not be as far-fetched after all. Nonetheless, for the time being we opt for 
grouping ‘Transfer of Templates’ and ‘Exchange of Resources: Expertise’ 
together as mechanisms oriented towards policy implications while keeping 
‘Ideological Advocacy’ in brackets. 
Moreover, certain context conditions matter in a systematic way influencing 
the explanatory power or the determinacy of mechanisms. One context 
condition that showed consistent relevance across cases and mechanisms 
was the extent to which the Commission officials pursued an own, well 
defined policy agenda. For the ‘Anticipating Council Shadow’ mechanism the 
existence of such an agenda decreases determinacy as it results in pro-active 
strategies to counter the constraints the mechanism puts on position 
formation. Here, the proposal for a European Institute of Technology provides 
an example. For the ‘Transfer of Templates’ and ‘Exchange of Resources’ 
mechanisms, in contrast, the existence of a well defined Commission agenda 
raises determinacy since the combination of this specific context condition 
and the mechanism allows us to gain leverage as to which national templates 
are transferred or which particular resources and thus organised interests 
are demanded by the drafting parts of the Commission. This is highlighted by 
the Consumer Credit case. 
While the existence of an own policy agenda is a context condition that is 
situated more towards initiation of a drafting process and thus affects the 
set-off of the particular mechanism, we also observed context conditions 
that more directly interacted with the mechanism and thus changed the 
predicted outcome during the drafting process. One example in this regard is 
the broader political climate which can determine which external interest 
can offer legitimacy. The conjunction with the ‘Exchange of Resources’ 
mechanism then explains the position that is taken by the Commission. Here, 
the proposal on Financial Conglomerates is a case in point. Another example 
for the interaction of context and mechanism is offered by the Food 
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Supplements proposal. A rising market and corresponding lobbying activities 
changed member state preferences thus altering the outcome produced by 
the shadow mechanism during the drafting process. 
It is to be noted that alternative hypotheses to the three types of interests 
and detected mechanisms are conceivable for explaining Commission 
positions. Taking up this issue we stress that, first, in the broader project on 
position formation we are able to check for a number of other factors 
(Hartlapp et al., 2009). Yet, for this paper our interest is not to weight relative 
influence of actors among other factors or among different interests. We are 
concerned with the functioning and conditions for mechanisms at play. 
Second, for each type of interest the case studies take up the challenge to 
show empirically that it is the mechanism that is causal to the outcome. This 
insight is based on substantial in-depth knowledge of the cases developed in 
the course of the research project. Further, to enhance reliability we have 
critically scrutinized each case cross-wise among the authors in this respect. 
Finally, reflecting upon the scope of the findings two aspects need to be 
mentioned. First, our 48 cases showed that the mechanisms matter to 
different degrees across cases. Of course, an inductive approach has its limits 
in quantifying the relevance of the presented phenomena at play. And, as we 
argue in the introduction, the line between the three different types of 
interests is sometimes blurred empirically. Nevertheless, in most of our 
cases national interests and organised societal interests were much more 
often relevant than party political interests. With respect to the two broader 
categories of ‘political constraint’ and ‘policy implication’ mechanisms the 
picture seems to be more balanced across our 48 cases. Secondly, we 
consider that some of the mechanisms are more closely linked to specifics of 
the EU political system than others. For example, the comparatively small 
size of the EU Commission and the relatively greater distance between 
decision takers and addressees increase the likeliness of an exchange of 
influence against expertise or legitimacy. However, in principle there are 
good grounds to expect them to matter for position formation in other 
political systems, too. National political systems are equally characterised by 
the need to gain support from different institutions for a legislative act. 
Position formation often requires additional external resources. Rather than 
the mechanisms themselves we think that their relative weight to explain 
outcomes as well as the type of external interest may vary here – national 
interests are rather unlikely to matter to the same extent, while party 
political influence can be expected to be of higher significance. As such our 
results can contribute to more refined theories, hypotheses and implications 
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of position formation within the European Commission and – said with 
somewhat more caution – they also provide valuable insight into position 
formation beyond the Commission. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Much of EU studies on policy making are merely attending to the question 
whether European policy initiation is influenced by external interests or not. 
This brought us to asking how the exact mechanisms look like which allow 
external interests to enter the European Commission’s position. Taking 48 
cases studies as empirical basis we distilled a number of mechanisms how 
different types of external interests enter position formation of the EU’s 
‘bureaucracy’. In this paper we presented the mechanisms that appeared 
most prominent in our empirical cases across policy fields: national interests 
typically enter position formation via mechanisms of ‘Anticipating Council 
Shadow’ and ‘Transfer of Templates’, organised societal interests through 
mechanisms of ‘Exchange of Resources’ (either Legitimacy or Expertise) and 
party political interests through mechanisms of ‘Anticipating EP Shadow’ and 
‘Ideological Advocacy’. 
Another important insight our empirical material indicates is that these 
causal pathways are largely stable across different legislative processes and 
portable across policy areas. Especially the mechanisms of ‘Anticipating 
Council Shadow’ and ‘Transfer of Templates’ for national interests as well as 
an ‘Exchange of Resources’ (Legitimacy and Expertise) for organised societal 
interests can be traced throughout almost all cases of our broader sample, 
while the mechanisms uncovered for party interest are portable in principle 
but appear to be at work much more rarely.  
In sum, the paper indicates that bringing the “mechanismic worldview” 
(Gerring, 2008) to the study of position formation in the European 
Commission bears added value, conceptually as well as empirically. 
Empirically, it is relevant because it takes us a step forward in 
understanding process and conditions of influence and thus goes beyond the 
notion of access only. Conceptually, the essential point is that ‘external 
interests’ as a factor can be mirrored in the final Commission position while 
causal pathways through which this happens may differ. This underscores 
that any comprehensive evaluation of the question if particular interests 
influence the Commission position must take into account that this can 
involve several answers to the question of how these interests exert 
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influence – no matter whether national, societal, or party interest are of 
concern.  
Our approach does not claim universal generalisation, but we contend that 
the mechanisms uncovered and analysed in this paper are indeed portable 
across different drafting processes in the Commission and across different 
policy fields. The mechanisms presented in this paper were distilled 
inductively. Thus, strictly speaking, the empirical evidence can not serve as 
test for their validity. However, it is stressed that the empirical basis 
consists of a medium number of cases (48) analysed in a multiannual 
research project on “Position Formation in the EU Commission”. In the 
project we were able to check what we found across a medium number of 
cases and to select those that describe the relevant mechanisms best. Thus, 
we claim that the evidence presented is typical for the mechanisms through 
which different types of external interests influence a specific outcome put 
forward by the EU Commission as legislative proposal. 
Against this background our results aim to stimulate those strands of 
literature that deal with EU policy making in the light of differing national, 
societal or party interest. On the one hand, some of the uncovered 
mechanisms do indeed support certain extant theories. Examples are the 
‘Anticipation of Council Shadow’ mechanism which conforms to a 
rationalist-institutionalist view of decision-making (Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2000) or of the ‘Exchange of Resources’ mechanism which supports the 
resource dependency view on interest group influence (Bouwen, 2002; Beyers 
and Kerremans, 2007). On the other hand, our results show that one causal 
pathway is only part of the story how external interests enter the 
Commission position. For theoretical development, thus, future research 
could engage into analysing the pre-conditions that trigger one or the other 
mechanism that links a specific external interest with the substance of a 
Commission proposal or the effects that the persistence of specific 
mechanisms has for the problem-solving capacity or legitimacy of resulting 
policies. Ultimately, this can result in better answers to the old question in 
whose interest European bureaucrats from their positions. 
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